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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Wardwell Marsh contends the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the
evidence found on his person because the officers did not have probable cause to justify the
warrantless search of his person. The district court made several clearly-erroneous findings of
fact and it used an improper bright-line rule rather than the appropriate totality-of-thecircumstances analysis established in Idaho and United States Supreme Court precedent. As a
result, this Court should reverse the order denying Mr. Marsh’s motion to suppress and remand
this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Marsh was one of two passengers in a car which Officer Eric Miller stopped for not
having a front license plate as it pulled into a driveway. 1 (Tr., p.3, Ls.13-23.)2 The driver, who
had stepped out of the car at the outset of the stop, asked Mr. Marsh to get out of the car so he
could get his registration information out of the glove compartment.

(Tr., p.5, Ls.16-18.)

Mr. Marsh was instructed to stand nearby under another officer’s supervision.

(Tr., p.17,

L.16 - p.18, L.8.) Officer Miller collected Mr. Marsh’s identification, checked for warrants, and
found none. (Tr., p.8, Ls.2-8.) Officer Miller told Mr. Marsh that they did not have probable
cause to search his person without his consent, and Mr. Marsh refused to consent to such a
search. (Tr., p.7, Ls.12-17, p.14, Ls.21-24.)

1

The district found that no one in the car lived at that particular house. (R., p.80.) However,
none of the witnesses testified to that fact during the hearing on the motion to suppress. (See
generally Tr.)
2
All references to “Tr.” in this brief are to the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress
which was held on June 21, 2017.
1

Officer Miller was actually more interested in the driver because the officer had noticed
puncture marks on the driver’s arm when he had stepped out of the car. (Tr., p.5, Ls.16-18.)
Additionally, the officer testified: “While [the driver] was going through the glove box, I did see
an orange cap laying on the floor in the front passenger area.” (Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, L.2; but see
R., p.81 (district court found that Officer Miller saw the syringe cap when Mr. Marsh was getting
out of the car).) Officer Miller noticed a syringe cap on the floor of the car where the driver was
sitting. (Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, L.8, p.13, Ls.4-8; but see R., p.81 (the district court concluding the
officer saw the cap as Mr. Marsh was getting out of the car).) Officer Miller called for a drug
dog to come to the scene. (Tr., p.8, Ls.12-17.) He also learned that the driver’s license was
suspended. (Tr., p.8, Ls.8-11.) While he was writing the citations for the driver, the drug dog
arrived and alerted at the still-open passenger door. (Tr., p.8, L.23 - p.9, L.10.) The officers
searched the car and found an Altoids tin containing “a small plastic bag” of methamphetamine
between the driver’s seat and the center console. (Tr., p.9, Ls.17-25; but see R., p.81 (the district
court finding the tin contained “baggies” of methamphetamine).)
Officer Miller proceeded to search both Mr. Marsh and the other passenger who had been
in the car. (Tr., p.10, Ls.20-25.) Officer Miller testified that the Altoids tin was within reach of
all three people in the car. (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-4.) However, he subsequently clarified that the other
passenger had been released without charges because nothing of interest within her “lunge area.”
(Tr., p.19, Ls.3-10.) Mr. Marsh continued to object to the search of his person. (Tr., p.15,
Ls.18-19.) However, the district court indicated he admitted that he had drugs on his person
during that search.

(R., p.81; but see generally Tr. (no testimony that he made such an

admission).) Officer Miller ultimately found drugs on Mr. Marsh’s person and placed him under
arrest for possessing those drugs. (Tr., p.11, Ls.18-23.)

2

Mr. Marsh moved to suppress the drugs found on his person, arguing they were found as
the result of an unlawful warrantless search. (R., pp.58-59, Tr., p.26, L.10 - p.30, L.10, p.32,
L.3 - p.33, L.7.) Specifically, he contended that the dog alert only gave the officers probable
cause to search the car, not his person, and that his mere presence in the place drugs were found
did not give rise to probable cause to search him. (Tr., p.30, Ls.8-10.) The district court rejected
that argument, concluding that, because the officers had actually found drugs in the car along
with the syringe cap, they inherently had probable cause to search all the occupants of the car.
(R., pp.87-88.)
Subsequently, Mr. Marsh entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to
challenge the district court’s decision on his motion to suppress. (R., p.106.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, which it suspended for a fouryear term of probation. (R., p.139.) Mr. Marsh filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment
of conviction. (R., pp.138, 144.)

3

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Marsh’s motion to suppress the evidence found
on his person.

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Marsh’s Motion To Suppress The Evidence Found On
His Person
The standard of review on a motion to suppress is bifurcated, with the appellate court
deferring to the district court’s factual findings which are supported by substantial evidence, but
freely reviewing the application of the law to those facts. State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 281
(Ct. App. 2005).

A.

The District Court Made Several Findings Of Fact Which Were Contrary To Or Not
Based On The Evidence Elicited At The Motion To Suppress Hearing
The district court errs when it considers assertions of fact which, while they may appear

elsewhere in the record, were not actually testified to or presented in admitted exhibits during the
hearing on the motion to suppress. State v. Smith, 162 Idaho 878, 885 n.6 (Ct. App. 2017)
(“[I]t would be improper to consider these facts on appeal as they were not presented to the
district court at the time the motion to suppress was being considered.”), State v. Babb, 136
Idaho 95, 97 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the district court improperly relied on assertions of
fact in the prosecutor’s brief which had not actually been proved by the evidence offered in
regard to the motion to suppress).
In this case, the district court made several findings of fact which were contrary to or not
based on the evidence elicited at the hearing on the motion to suppress:
-

The district court found that no one in the car lived at the house where the car had
pulled up to at the start of the traffic stop. (R., p.80.) However, none of the witnesses
offered any testimony regarding who lived in that house. (See generally Tr.)

-

The district court found that Officer Miller saw the syringe cap when Mr. Marsh was
getting out of the car even though Officer Miller clearly testified: “While [the driver]

5

was going through the glove box, I did see an orange cap laying on the floor in the
front passenger area.” (Compare R., p.81 with Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, L.2.)
-

The district court found there were “baggies” of methamphetamine in the Altoids tin
even though Officer Miller testified that “[t]here was a small plastic bag” containing
methamphetamine in the tin. (Compare R., p.81, with Tr., p.9, Ls.23-25 (emphasis
added).)

-

The district court found that Mr. Marsh admitted that he had drugs on his person
while the officer was searching him. (R., p.81.) None of the witnesses testified to
Mr. Marsh making such a statement. (See generally Tr.) In fact, Officer Miller
testified that Mr. Marsh “objected to the consent after we located the Altoids tin in the
car.” (Tr., p.15, Ls.14-19.)

Because none of those factual findings are supported by the evidence elicited in regard to the
motion to suppress, those factual findings were not supported by competent evidence. Smith,
162 Idaho at 885 n.6; Babb, 136 Idaho at 97. As a result, these factual findings are clearly
erroneous. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009) (reiterating that, when not
supported by substantial and competent evidence, findings of fact are clearly erroneous).
Rather than consider the evidence elicited at the hearing on the motion to suppress, it
appears the district court based those factual findings on statements in Officer Marsh’s police
report. (Compare R., pp.80-81 with R., p.11 (copy of the police report attached to the probable
cause affidavit filed in support of the initial complaint).) The police report was not presented or
admitted as evidence during the motion to suppress proceedings. (See generally R., Tr.) The
district court erred by considering that as evidence. Smith, 162 Idaho at 885 n.6; Babb, 136
Idaho at 97.

6

Since those factual findings were clearly erroneous, this Court should not consider them,
and should consider the evidence actually elicited in regard to the motion to suppress in its free
review of the application of the law in this case instead. (See Section B, infra.)

B.

Applying The Proper Legal Analysis, There Was No Probable Cause To Justify The
Search Of Mr. Marsh’s Person
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures of “persons,

houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. CONST. amend IV. The occupants of a car have a heightened
expectation of privacy in their persons than in the car itself.

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526

U.S. 295, 303 (1999); Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281. Therefore, even though the officer might have
probable cause to search a vehicle, the passenger’s mere presence in that vehicle is not a
sufficient basis to search the passenger’s person. Gibson, 141 Idaho at 282. Rather, whether an
officer can search a passenger’s person depends on whether there was probable cause that the
passenger has engaged in criminal conduct based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 283
(nothing probable cause needs to be particularized to the person or place to be searched); accord
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 373-74 (2003) (reaffirming the requirement for
particularity and distinguishing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 592-94 (1948), because the
evidence in Di Re was particularized to one of the people in the car, whereas no such singling out
was evident in the facts in Pringle).
Thus, in Gibson, even though a drug dog had alerted on the car, the officers did not have
probable cause to search the passenger himself because the totality of the circumstances vis-à-vis
the passenger did not show any particularized indication of his involvement in the suspected
criminal activity. Id. at 284-85. For example, the officers had no prior information regarding
Mr. Gibson’s involvement in drug activities, evasive conduct by the defendant, or that he was

7

present in a high crime area. Id. at 285. Furthermore, the officers had searched the car in Gibson
and found no drugs. Id. at 285 (distinguishing, inter alia, Pringle on that basis). Absent that sort
of particularized information, the officers did not have probable cause to search Mr. Gibson
despite the dog alert. Id. at 286.
In Pringle, on the other hand, the officers received consent to search the car and found
$763 dollars of “rolled-up cash” in the glove compartment of the car as well as five glassine bags
of cocaine between the back-seat armrest and the back seat of the car. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 368.
Upon questioning, none of the three men in the car claimed ownership of the drugs or the cash.
Id. at 368-69. The Supreme Court explained that, given the totality of the circumstances in that
case, the presence of the large amount of drugs, which were accessible to all three men, as well
as the presence of the cash in the glove compartment, established probable cause that all three
men were involved in a clandestine effort to traffic drugs, and thus, established probable cause to
believe all of them had knowledge of, and exercised dominion over, the cocaine. Id. at 371-72,
see id. at 372 n.2 (noting the particular impact of the presence of the cash as a factor within the
totality of the circumstances). Because the officers had that probable cause, their decision to
arrest Mr. Pringle did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and his subsequent confession to
owning the drugs was admissible. Id. at 369, 374.
Rather than engage in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis called for in Pringle, the
district court in Mr. Marsh’s case, citing State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 578 (2010), concluded
that the presence of drugs in the car inherently gave officers probable cause to arrest all the
occupants therein. (R., p.87 n.3.) That bright-line analysis is not proper, and is not actually
supported by James.

The James Court noted that contraband had been found in a hair

“scrunchy” in the car and, upon questioning, none of the occupants admitted ownership of it.
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James, 148 Idaho at 575. Thus, the James Court’s conclusion reflects the conclusion in Pringle
– that presence of drugs in a car and no evidence that it singles out one particular occupant is
enough to create probable cause that all the occupants had knowledge of and dominion over the
contraband. 3 Compare id. with Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371-72. However, just as Pringle did not
set a bright-line rule to that effect, nothing in James suggests that the same conclusion was
dictated in all cases where drugs were found in a car. See generally id.
After all, the totality of the circumstances are necessarily analyzed on a case-by-case
basis. See, e.g., State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 419 (2014). In fact, that is precisely the reason
the United States Supreme Court has routinely rejected bright-line rules in the Fourth
Amendment context. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 158 (2013) (“While the
desire for a bright-line rule is understandable, the Fourth Amendment will not tolerate adoption
of an overly broad categorical approach that would dilute the warrant requirement in a context
where significant privacy interests are at stake.”); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 125
(2006) (“But the Fourth Amendment does not insist upon bright-line rules. Rather, it recognizes
that no single set of legal rules can capture the ever-changing complexity of human life. It
consequently uses the general terms ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’ And this Court has
continuously emphasized that reasonableness is measured by examining the totality of the

3

The James Court noted the limited nature of the evidence presented in the district court. James,
148 Idaho at 578. Thus, for example, there is no indication as to whether there was evidence that
the hair scrunchy was more likely the property of the lone female occupant of the car, as opposed
to either of the two men (hair length, and thus, potential need of a hair scrunchy, being a matter
of personal style choices). See generally id. However, since the question in that case was
whether the defendant had met his threshold burden to establish that he was in custody for
Miranda purposes, the absence of such evidence weighed against him. See id. Here, however,
such a conclusion is improper because the State bore the burden to prove that an exception to the
warrant requirement applied. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)
(unanimously holding that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless the State proves
an exception to the warrant requirement applies).
9

circumstances.”) (internal quotation and modifications omitted). Therefore, the district court
misread James by concluding it established a bright-line rule that the presence of drugs always
creates probable cause to arrest all the occupants of the car.
To the extent the district court correctly read James, that would mean James is
inconsistent with Pringle, since James would create a bright-line rule, rather than the totality-ofthe-circumstances analysis called for in Pringle. As such, if the district court correctly read
James, this Court should overrule James to the extent it is inconsistent with controlling United
States Supreme Court precedent on this issue of federal constitutional law. See Houghland
Farms v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990) (holding that this Court will follow precedent unless
it is manifestly wrong, unjust, or unwise, or overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious
principles of law and remedy continued injustice).
Thus, properly considering the totality of the circumstances as Pringle directs, this case is
more like Gibson and Di Re than Pringle and James. In Pringle, the particularized probable
cause was that all the occupants in the car were trafficking drugs, as evidenced by the five
separate glassine bags of cocaine and the noteworthy roll of money. The “small plastic bag”
found in this case does not have the same impact in the totality of the circumstances that the
larger quantity of separately-packaged drugs had in Pringle. The personal use amounts of drugs
found in the Altoids tin in the driver’s car does not indicate a joint venture to deal drugs. Rather,
it singles out the driver as the party who possessed the drugs. After all, it was the driver, not
Mr. Marsh, who had puncture marks on his arm. Additionally, the officer saw the syringe cap on
the floor on the passenger side of the car after the driver had sat in that seat and opened the glove
compartment of his car.
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There was also no evidence of a joint venture between the people in the car like there was
in Pringle. There was no noteworthy roll of cash. The Altoids tin was not really accessible to
the other people in the car, evidenced by the fact that the officers let the other passenger leave
without charges specifically because nothing of interest had been found within her “lunge area.”
There was no other evidence suggesting Mr. Marsh had knowledge of or dominion over the
Altoids tin. Rather, the totality of those circumstances further indicates the Altoid’s tin was the
driver’s personal stash of drugs.
Since the totality of the circumstances in this case single out the driver as the party who
possessed the contraband, the totality of the circumstances in this case indicates that, like in
Gibson and Di Re, there was no probable cause particularized to Mr. Marsh that would justify the
warrantless intrusion into his heightened expectation of privacy in his person. As such, the fruits
of that unlawful search should have been suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Marsh respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his motion to
suppress and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 21st day of May, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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